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Abstract

In February 2014, the non-governmental Swiss Medical Board recommended that mammography
programmes in Switzerland may eventually be closed down because they might not deliver more benefits than
harms. In the resulting uproar the board was accused of being "unethical." Controversy about mammography
has persisted in the UK, US, Canada, and elsewhere, and disputes about overdiagnosis exist in prostate cancer,
chronic kidney disease, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and many other conditions. People
concerned about overdiagnosis are compelled by evidence of harms outweighing benefits. But not everyone is
equally compelled. This may be because of disagreements over the evidence, conflicts of interest, or cognitive
biases. Another possible cause of disagreement is that some people may not think that benefits and harms are
the most important consideration. This contrast, between people who think outcomes are what matters most
and people who disagree, is central to the discipline of ethics. It is a crucial difference between utilitarian
ethicists and non-consequentialist ethicists. Broadly, utilitarians think that, given several options, we should
choose the one that produces the best overall outcome (the most utility among the whole group of affected
people), ensuring that each person counts equally in the calculation. Non-consequentialists don't consider
outcomes to be so important: other ethical concerns, such as rights, duties, or respect for people's dignity or
autonomy, matter more.
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Analysis

ANALYSIS
ESSAY

Overdiagnosis, ethics, and trolley problems: why
factors other than outcomes matter—an essay by Stacy
Carter
If the only ethically important consideration was the balance of benefit to harm, overdiagnosis might
be less contested, writes Stacy Carter. But evidence and intuitions from famous thought experiments
could explain some peoples’ willingness to accept the harms of overdiagnosis—other factors may
feel more important to them
Stacy M Carter associate professor
Sydney Health Ethics, K25 Medical Foundation Building, The University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

In February 2014, the non-governmental Swiss Medical Board
recommended that mammography programmes in Switzerland
may eventually be closed down because they might not deliver
more benefits than harms. In the resulting uproar the board was
accused of being “unethical.”1
Controversy about mammography has persisted in the UK,2
US,3 Canada, and elsewhere,4 and disputes about overdiagnosis
exist in prostate cancer,5 chronic kidney disease,6
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),7 and many
other conditions. People concerned about overdiagnosis are
compelled by evidence of harms outweighing benefits. But not
everyone is equally compelled. This may be because of
disagreements over the evidence,8 conflicts of interest,9 10 or
cognitive biases.11 Another possible cause of disagreement is
that some people may not think that benefits and harms are the
most important consideration.

This contrast, between people who think outcomes are what
matters most and people who disagree, is central to the discipline
of ethics. It is a crucial difference between utilitarian ethicists
and non-consequentialist ethicists. Broadly, utilitarians think
that, given several options, we should choose the one that
produces the best overall outcome (the most utility among the
whole group of affected people), ensuring that each person
counts equally in the calculation.12 Non-consequentialists don’t
consider outcomes to be so important: other ethical concerns,
such as rights, duties, or respect for people’s dignity or
autonomy, matter more.13

The few or the many?

For decades, non-consequentialists have used thought
experiments known as trolley problems, ostensibly to show that

utilitarians are wrong. Two classic trolley problems are “switch”
and “bridge.”
In the switch problem, a trolley (tram) is hurtling down a track.
Five workers are on the main track. One worker is on a branch
track. If the trolley continues, it will kill the five workers. A
switch will divert the trolley onto the side track, and it will kill
one worker.14 15 Should you throw the switch?

In the bridge problem, five workers are on the track. A large,
heavy person stands on a bridge. If you push the person off the
bridge and onto the track it will stop the trolley. The large person
will die; the five will live.14 15 Should you push the person?
Many utilitarian philosophers would not recognise an ethical
difference between throwing the switch and pushing the person:
in both scenarios one person dies so that five people live. So
you should throw and push, respectively—you should harm one
person to benefit five.
In empirical studies of ordinary people, however, responses to
the two scenarios differ. About 90% of people say it is
acceptable to throw the switch,16 17 whereas only 10% of people
are comfortable with pushing the person.16 Non-consequentialists
say that this shows that utilitarians are wrong: something more
than outcomes must matter.14-19

Reactions are generally even stronger to a medical example
known as “transplant.” A skilled transplant surgeon has five
patients who will die without immediate transplantation, each
of a different organ. A passerby happens to be a perfect donor
for all five patients. Should the surgeon anaesthetise the passerby
and transplant their organs, saving the five but killing the donor?
Almost everyone says no emphatically,20 even though it results
in one dead person and five survivors, just as in “switch.”
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Clearly then, say the non-consequentialists, you can’t just use
outcomes to determine the right thing to do.

Intuitions about what matters
Why do people respond differently to the trolley scenarios even
though they result in the same number of lives saved and lost?
Theoretical and experimental research indicates that framing is
important, including the order in which options are presented
and the terminology used (for example, “saving” versus
“killing”).17 21 People may be less willing to trade lives for lives
and more willing to trade injuries or property loss for lives.17
Avoiding harm may seem more important than providing
benefit.14-22 Serious outcomes may not be exchangeable for (even
many) more trivial outcomes.13

Rights may be seen as trumping utility.14-22 Harms may seem
morally worse if intended.16 Trade-offs between already affected
groups may be more acceptable than putting new people at risk.16
Certain harms may be considered more salient than uncertain
harms.13-23 And proximal and identifiable victims may be
considered more salient, especially if they are kin.13-23
These intuitions can’t necessarily be morally justified, and
ethicists argue about their moral significance. They do, however,
indicate likely reactions when people are asked to trade off
outcomes among people or to agree to harm a few people to
benefit or save more.

Overdiagnosis as a trolley problem
Overdiagnosis is often presented like a trolley problem, for two
good reasons: to make the concept comprehensible and because
it is a fundamentally utilitarian concept.

When we use the label “overdiagnosis,” we indicate that an
accepted practice in a health system that had been thought to
be doing good is, counterintuitively, doing harm.24 A screening
test, a diagnostic standard, or a routine check-up that had been
considered beneficial is in fact harmful. Of course, most
diagnoses do good and harm: they avert harms for some and
cause harms to others. So thinking about overdiagnosis requires
trading-off bad outcomes against other bad outcomes, often in
different people who are not always identifiable.
Consider, for example, 10 000 men who are invited to undergo
screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm. Over 13-15 years,
about 46 will avoid death due to abdominal aortic aneurysm,
while 176 will start unnecessary lifelong surveillance. Of these
176 men, 37 will have unnecessary surgery, from which 1-2
will die.25

In a cohort of children diagnosed as having ADHD, some are
helped, on balance, by treatment, whereas others experience no
benefits, only weight loss, growth suppression, stigmatisation,
and reduced family finances because of medication costs.7

When such evidence is summarised to help with communication,
it looks even more like a trolley problem. A decision aid might
show, for example, that for every four women who avoid
preventable death from breast cancer through screening, 19 will
be overdiagnosed as having breast cancer.26
If overdiagnosis is presented like a trolley problem, then it seems
likely to elicit similar moral intuitions to trolley problems (table
For personal use only: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions

1⇓). The responses to trolley problems might help to explain
why people are willing to accept high levels of overdiagnosis
harm, as shown in some empirical studies.27

Ethicists disagree strongly about whether items in the left hand
column are good reasons or provide justification.13-21 These are
moral intuitions that people are likely to hold rather than moral
truths.

Weaknesses in utilitarian reasoning
Two other recognised problems with utilitarianism are relevant
to overdiagnosis.

Firstly, utilitarians appear cold hearted towards the minority
who suffer for the benefit of others. In utilitarianism, what
matters is the overall outcome, not the effect on specific
individuals, so they may accept a small number of people
suffering a great deal if many benefit as a result. Utilitarians are
thus accused of indifference to the suffering minority.

This seems relevant to policy on overdiagnosis. Decision makers
may stop a screening programme or move a diagnostic boundary
to improve outcomes overall. But a few people are likely to be
worse off as a result, and the new policy may seem to disregard
their suffering.
A related problem is that many people falsely believe that they
are alive only because they had disease detected early through
screening and endured sometimes onerous treatment. Preventing
future harm from overdiagnosis requires being publicly honest
about the overdiagnosis that has happened in the past. But this
will alert such people to the possibility that they may have been
needlessly harmed through overdiagnosis. This harm needs to
be taken seriously, and these people may require support.

The second problem with utilitarianism is that it requires
calculation and comparison of all the benefits and harms that
will result from different courses of action. Identifying and
measuring all relevant benefits and harms is extremely difficult,
especially because people evaluate the benefits and harms that
they experience very differently, in ways that can’t always be
reflected well in a hard outcome measure.28 Nonetheless, without
their perspective, we can’t really understand the relevant
outcomes.
Mental health diagnoses and treatments, for example, are
sometimes dismissed as predominantly overdiagnosis and
overtreatment. In some cases this is justified. In others it may
give insufficient weight to the suffering and stigma that
accompany such problems and the complexity of finding a
combination of treatments that can provide relief. Before
researchers declare, for example, that most diagnoses of
depression are unjustified, they may need to interrogate whether
they have taken sufficient account of the full range and
weighting of benefits and harms that matter to the people who
are diagnosed as having depression and their loved ones.

Implications for action
These observations have implications for researchers,
policymakers, and clinicians. A commonly proposed response
to overdiagnosis is clearer, simpler communication to aid
decisions about policy and care, such as the excellent decision
aid for mammographic screening I mentioned above, which
Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
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contrasts four deaths against 19 overdiagnoses in 1000 women
over 20 years.26 This simplification is done for good reasons;
but it also creates a trolley-like problem, with inherent
limitations. It elides probability and uncertainty, which affect
people’s judgments.20 It neglects human willingness to accept
many injuries and inconveniences to prevent one death, and it
ignores other things that—justifiably or not—people might
consider important (for example, a “right” to screening).

If overdiagnosis is a utilitarian concept, it may need a utilitarian
solution. Overdiagnosis occurs because the standards in
healthcare systems are set at the wrong point—excessive
screening targets, a condition too broadly defined, a diagnostic
threshold set too low. If the problem is with the system, perhaps
we should not expect individual clinicians or patients to fix it,
even if armed with better information. Responsibility should
arguably lie upstream, with those who measure outcomes
(researchers) and those who design the system (policymakers
and planners).
Epidemiologists, policymakers, and planners think in utilities,
so are susceptible to the weaknesses of utilitarianism (neglecting
disadvantaged minorities and problems with measurement).
Countering this is challenging but not impossible. When
measuring mammography outcomes, for example, qualitative
and health economic studies with both the general public and
affected women could help determine relevant benefits and
harms and refine their relative weights.

If evidence of overdiagnosis is sufficient to justify policy
change, decision makers should not just focus on overall utility,
but also publicly acknowledge that a minority might be worse
off and communicate how they will be cared for. If
mammography programmes were stopped, for example, a small
number of women may develop life-threatening cancer that
would have been detected earlier with screening. This could be
acknowledged and public efforts made to ensure these women
have access to the best treatment.

Researchers testing public attitudes to overdiagnosis should be
aware that the same problem framed in different ways may elicit
different moral intuitions. It may be informative to
systematically compare people’s perceptions of overdiagnoses
that demand different trade-offs (for example, for fatal and
non-fatal conditions; for interventions that aim to benefit and
those that aim to prevent harm) and to compare people who
have and have not experienced conditions directly (for example,
people who have had kin with breast cancer and those who have
not).
Clinicians talking with their patients about overdiagnosis may
encounter the moral intuitions described here: discussing them
directly might be useful. Some clinicians may be sceptical about
overdiagnosis and have these same moral intuitions; they might
consider exploring these further, remembering that they are
common but not always justified.
Good decisions and communication about overdiagnosis in
policy and clinical care are demanding. Every example of
overdiagnosis requires different trade-offs. In any intervention
to prevent overdiagnosis, some will gain and others will lose.
The utilitarian problem of overdiagnosis demands a utilitarian
solution: changing healthcare systems so that, on balance, they
increase rather than undermine wellbeing. The challenge is not
just to show that the gains outweigh the losses, but also to show
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proper care and respect for those who lose and to recognise the
outcomes that matter to people on both sides.
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Key messages
The concept of overdiagnosis relies on utilitarian reasoning, where the right action is the one that produces the best outcome overall,
ensuring everyone counts equally in that calculation
Overdiagnosis is often presented in the form of a trolley problem—that is, as a trade-off between imminent harms to identifiable victims
(eg, four women saved from cancer death against 19 women harmed by overdiagnosis)
Three decades of research on trolley problems suggests that this may elicit a range of moral intuitions that go beyond maximising benefit
and minimising harm
Clinicians and researchers working on overdiagnosis can’t avoid utilitarian reasoning but should acknowledge and allow for its recognised
weaknesses

Table
Table 1| Theoretical analysis and experimental findings about trolley problems and their relevance to overdiagnosis
Responses to trolley problems

Possible relevance to overdiagnosis

The acceptability of a trade off may depend on what
is traded or how it is presented—eg, saving v killing,
injuries or property loss v lives, lives v lives

Some interventions likely to produce overdiagnosis (eg, some cancer screening, screening for abdominal
aortic aneurysm, troponin screening) promise to save lives. Those who dismiss overdiagnosis as a concern
often emphasise the importance of saving lives, which may increase willingness to trade off against injury
of even large numbers of people. People may be more compelled by examples of overdiagnosis that cause
death (“kill”)

Avoiding harm may seem more important than
providing benefit

A few overdiagnosing interventions offer benefits—eg, diagnosing low testosterone promises improved
wellbeing through treatment—but generally overdiagnosing interventions offer avoidance of harm (eg, of
cancer, diabetes, or kidney disease). If people are primed to avoid harm, they may be more reluctant to
give up these interventions

Serious outcomes may not be exchangeable for (even People may be less receptive to information about overdiagnosis of potentially fatal conditions (eg,
a large number of) trivial outcomes
cardiovascular disease, cancer) than of non-fatal conditions (eg, ADHD). In cancer, especially, the trade-off
tends to be small numbers of preventable deaths against many unnecessary injurious treatments (but not
deaths). People may be primed to accept such trade-offs to prevent cancer death
Rights may trump utilities

Justifiably or not, people may feel that removing overdiagnosing services undermines important rights (eg,
to life, to health or control of their health, to screening services) and that these rights are more compelling
than increasing utility

Harms may seem morally worse if intended

People may perceive the harms arising from overdiagnosis as unintended, and thus less problematic.
Ethicists disagree over whether intentions are morally important: utilitarians hold that they are not

Trade-offs between already affected groups may be
more acceptable than putting new people at risk

This may help explain why overdiagnosis from screening well people feels morally different to overdiagnosis
of symptomatic people. Symptomatic people are arguably already affected; in clinical care there is always
a number needed to treat, some are harmed and some benefit, but all were previously ill and presented for
care. By contrast, well people are previously unaffected: when they are recruited to screening and
overdiagnosed they experience new harms that they would have otherwise avoided

Certain harms may be more salient than uncertain
harms

The harms averted and harms caused by overdiagnosing services are always uncertain: the evidence is
both probabilistic and contested, and it is rarely possible to know who will be harmed or benefit. This
uncertainty may decrease the perceived salience of the harms

Victims may be more salient if they are proximal and Direct experiences of loved ones’ illness may increase the emotional salience of those diseases; eg, personal
identifiable, especially if they are kin
experiences of breast cancer may make harms from breast cancer highly salient
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